Un rapport assez ancien (2004) du Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, « A Fence Around Jerusalem – The Construction of the Security Fence Around Jerusalem: General background and implications for the city and its metropolitan area » qui porte sur les conséquences du mur de l’apartheid sur Al Qods (Jérusalem) et particulièrement sa population palestiniennes apporte des informations intéressantes, et très détaillées concernant la période 1995-2004.
Saviez-vous par exemple que si le mur de l’apartheid fût réalisé à l’initiative de Sharon, sa planification et conception remontent à Rabin, prix Nobel de la paix:
The initial conception and incipient planning of the fence date back to the second government of Yitzhak Rabin, when Moshe Shahal, the Minister of Interior Security, initiated planning for the “seam zone.” (p. 2)
At the beginning of 1995, the wave of suicide bombings which began in late 1994, during the Oslo process, and extensive Palestinian criminal activity — theft of cars and of agricultural implements — led to the formulation of the “seam zone” plan. The term referred to a geographic strip (340 kilometers long, including the Jerusalem area, and ranging in width from a few kilometers to 20 kilometers) along both sides of the Green Line, which would be utilized to preempt and prevent terrorist and criminal activity originating from the West Bank.
On January 31, 1995, ten days after a terrorist attack at the soldiers’ hitchhiking station at Beit Lid junction, the Cabinet instructed the Finance Minister and the Interior Security Minister to set up teams in order to examine ways and means to bring about a separation between the population of sovereign Israel and the Palestinian population in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and to consider the economic and security implications of such a separation.3 The decision led to the establishment of a committee headed by Interior Security Minister Moshe Shahal, which drew up a plan based on three principles: Palestinians would be allowed to enter Israel through official crossing points after obtaining an entry permit and undergoing a security check by the Israel Police; the volume of vehicular traffic into Israel from the territories would be reduced and a system introduced to ensure the entry of goods and merchandise in a controlled manner through the official crossing points; and potential infiltrators and vehicles would be prevented (as far as possible) from entering Israel outside these points. The committee recommended the introduction of permanent and continuous routine-security measures (known as batash in the military Hebrew acronym) between the crossing points, this under the responsibility of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), and the construction of an obstacle on the access routes to prevent infiltration.
In the Jerusalem region the committee recommended the deployment of police and Border Police forces to supervise and oversee those entering the city. More specifically, the committee recommended the creation of six crossing points for goods, vehicles, and people seeking to enter the city from the West Bank. In addition, the committee said, access routes traversing Jerusalem’s area of jurisdiction should be blocked in order to ensure that traffic passed solely through the official crossing points. (pp. 7-8)
Et paradoxalement, ce fût sous Netanyahou que le projet de Rabin puis de Peres fût mis en veilleuse:
In July 1996, Yitzhak Mordechai, the Defense Minister in the new government of Benjamin Netanyahu, declared that he opposed the Rabin government’s separation plan. The plan was put on hold. (p. 9)
Et ce fût en réaction à une initiative d’un leader travailliste, Haïm Ramon (« Against this backdrop, MK Haim Ramon, a ranking figure in the Labor Party, established the Movement for Unilateral Separation« , p. 10), que Sharon initia la réalisation de ce projet travailliste.
La situation des résidents palestiniens d’Al Qods, titulaires d’une carte d’identité israëlienne mais non-citoyens, habitant en dehors des limites municipales d’Al Qods (la ville, annexée à Israël en 1967, s’étend de facto au-delà des limites municipales traditionnelles de jure, et empiète donc sur le territoire cisjordanien non-annexé à Israël) mérite d’être soulignée – ils sont considérés comme résidents permanents en Israël comme n’importe quelle au pair thaïlandaise ou philippine:
First, there is the problem of the East Jerusalem population, who carry Israeli ID cards but reside outside the Jerusalem area of jurisdiction, in Judea and Samaria. They have a singular legal status — permanent residents of Israel who are not citizens and reside outside the territory of the state. From the strictly legal point of view, no obligation exists to find the easiest or the shortest way for this group to enter Jerusalem, as their entry into Jerusalem constitutes a passage between two separate legal entities. (p. 23)
Cette catégorie de Palestiniens-là est donc étrangère dans son propre pays… Et savez-vous pourquoi ils n’habitent plus Al Qods? Parce que les autorités israëliennes n’accordent pas de permis de construire aux Arabes de la ville, alors que les mêmes autorités sont plus généreuses lorsque lesdits permis sont demandés en dehors d’Al Qods, démographie oblige:
The separation fence, especially to the east and north of Jerusalem, will make life very difficult for everyone who lives in East Jerusalem and the adjacent suburbs, and will have a significant impact on the status and economy of the entire city. The fence will split villages and neighborhoods, such as Abu Dis and A-Ram, and in some cases will separate members of the same family or hamula (clan). Unlike most of the separation fence, the obstacle in Jerusalem will divide not only Jews from Arabs but also cut off the Arab neighborhoods of East Jerusalem from the neighborhoods and villages outside the city’s area of jurisdiction. The critical question in this connection is the functioning of the crossing points and their operational regime.
Moreover, as noted above, various difficulties, as well as restrictions imposed by the Israeli authorities, have greatly limited Arab residential construction within Jerusalem. As a result, many Arab residents of the city who hold Israeli ID cards and “residents of the territories” are living in the same suburbs outside the city’s area of jurisdiction (in A-Ram and Al Azariya, for example). In some cases, some members of the same family or clan live in the city while others live outside. The “Jerusalemites” who reside outside the city are heavily dependent on Jerusalem in their everyday life and for the services they need. Thus, many children living outside the city attend schools in East Jerusalem, the residents turn to hospitals in East Jerusalem for medical services, and many hold jobs that are part of the Israeli labor market (including in the Jerusalem Municipality). Conversely, many students who reside in East Jerusalem attend Al Quds University, most of which is located in Abu Dis (outside the municipal area), and the cheaper shopping centers in Al Azariya and A-Ram rely on Jerusalem buyers. (pp. 71-72)
Par ailleurs, les auteurs soulignent et regrettent que ledit mur ne sépare pas plus clairement juifs et Palestiniens à Al Qods:
The major difficulty lies in the fact that in many cases the fence in the Jerusalem area does not separate Jewish and Arab populations, but instead cuts off Arabs living in the West Bank from Arabs living within the municipal boundaries of Jerusalem, despite the close family, social, and economic ties that bind the two groups. (p. 4)
To date, however, domestic political considerations have dictated that the fence will follow a route that leaves the majority of the Arab population on the “Israeli side.” It needs to be asked whether, given the vast planning and budget effort, which is subjecting Israel to mounting criticism in the international arena, it would not have been right to go one step further and try to “remove” from Israeli Jerusalem additional groups of Palestinians. This approach could be based on the fact that the municipal boundary has already been breached in two places: about 11,000 Palestinians have been excluded from Jerusalem in the Kafr Aqeb area and another 20,000 around Shuafat refugee camp. Thus, it is argued, a different route would have enabled the exclusion of several Arab neighborhoods from “Israeli Jerusalem,” reducing the city’s Palestinian population by 100,000 people and helping to strengthen Jerusalem’s status as a city with a solid Jewish majority and as the capital of Israel. (p. 89)
Car les aspects démographiques sont omniprésents, même si des considérations diplomatiques ont empêché les Israëliens de faire une opération de purification ethnique aussi intégrale qu’ils l’auraient souhaité:
Since the city’s unification, Israel has sought to preserve a clear-cut Jewish majority that will constitute demographic affirmation of Israeli control of Jerusalem. However, experts dealing with the future of Jerusalem maintain, on the basis of population projections, that the demographic balance in the city is “detrimental” to the Israeli interest, with the latest studies indicating that by 2020 Arabs will constitute 40 percent of the city’s population.
According to this approach, the prime Israeli interest is to incorporate as few Arabs as possible within “Israeli” Jerusalem, since an Arab population level of 40 to 50 percent is liable to endanger Israeli control not only in the eastern part of the city but in the western part as well.141
To date, however, domestic political considerations have dictated that the fence will follow a route that leaves the majority of the Arab population on the “Israeli side.” It needs to be asked whether, given the vast planning and budget effort, which is subjecting Israel to mounting criticism in the international arena, it would not have been right to go one step further and try to “remove” from Israeli Jerusalem additional groups of Palestinians.
This approach could be based on the fact that the municipal boundary has already been breached in two places: about 11,000 Palestinians have been excluded from Jerusalem in the Kafr Aqeb area and another 20,000 around Shuafat refugee camp. Thus, it is argued, a different route would have enabled the exclusion of several Arab neighborhoods from “Israeli Jerusalem,” reducing the city’s Palestinian population by 100,000 people and helping to strengthen Jerusalem’s status as a city with a solid Jewish majority and as the capital of Israel. (pp. 88-89)
Et c’est surtout sous l’angle démographique – le risque d’un retour dans les limites municipales d’Al Qods- que les difficultés engendrées par le mur pour les résidents palestiniens d’Al Qods habitant à l’extérieur de la ville pourraient susciter – qui soulève l’inquiétude dans la description des difficultés que rencontrent Palestiniens suite à la construction de ce mur:
From the Palestinians’ point of view, the obstacle, with its fences and enclaves, is the culmination of the restrictions Israel has imposed on their movement between Jerusalem and the territories since the Gulf War of 1991. Indeed, even at this early stage, the existence of a fence appears to be inducing many residents of East Jerusalem (who hold Israeli ID cards) to return to the city from rented accommodations outside the Jerusalem area of jurisdiction for fear of losing their rights. (A similar process of a return to East Jerusalem by residents of the city concerned about the possible loss of their rights occurred at the end of the 1980s, triggered by investigations undertaken by the National Insurance Institute and the Interior Ministry.) The question is how this process dovetails with the Israeli policy of maintaining the demographic balance (at a ratio of 70:30) between Jews and Arabs in Jerusalem. (p. 90)
Enfin, les auteurs du rapport rendent compte de leur façon de l’avis de la Cour internationale de justice sur la légalité du mur rendu le 9 juillet 2004:
The ICJ issued its opinion on the legality of the fence on July 9, 2004.76 The panel of judges declared that Israel “has the obligation to cease forthwith the works of construction of the wall being built by it in the Occupied Palestinian Territory” and that this “entails the dismantling forthwith of those parts of that structure situated within the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem” and the repeal of all legislation and regulations relating to the wall’s construction (par. 151). The vote was 14-1, the only dissenting vote being cast by Judge Thomas Buergenthal, a Jew, from the United States. Judge Buergenthal was also critical of Israel’s actions but argued that the court did not have at its disposal a sufficient factual basis for its sweeping findings and that the court would have done better to refrain from taking up the subject in the first place. (p. 43)
Documents complémentaires sur la purification ethnique et la colonisation à Al Qods:
– « Jerusalem as a Component of Israel’s National Security: Indicators of the State of the Capital, and a Look to the Future » (2006) – rapport israëlien mainstream, inquiet du nombre croissant d’habitants non-juifs à Al Qods;
– « Jerusalem the strangulation of the Arab Palestinian city » (2005), rapport de l’Applied Research Institute of Jerusalem (palestinien), dont on peut également consulter « Jerusalem, In Light of the Israeli Colonization Activities« , de la même année, ainsi que le plus récent (2007) « Israel’s Policy in Occupied East Jerusalem Push for “Voluntarily” & “Quiet Transfer” of Palestinians from the city« ;
– la page consacrée à Al Qods du site pro-palestinien Palestine Monitor;
– le rapport 2007 du Bureau pour la Coordination des Affaires Humanitaires de l’ONU pour les territoires palestiniens occupés, intitulé « East Jerusalem : The Humanitarian Impact of the West Bank Barrier | July 2007« ;
– le communiqué conjoint de l’Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions (ICAHD) et de la Civic Coalition for Defending the Palestinians’ Rights in Jerusalem (CCDPRJ) protestant contre le projet de plan d’urbanisme pour Al Qods adopté par la municipalité de Jérusalem;
– étude sur le statut en droit international d’Al Qods (Jérusalem) établie en 1997 par la Division des Droits palestiniens de l’ONU;
– la fiche d’informations de l’ONG Stop the wall consacré à Al Qods;
– le site de The Jerusalem Fund for Education & Community Development, ONG étatsunienne;
– la page sur Al Qods de la Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA);
– le site du Jerusalem Center For Social & Economic Rights (JCSER);
– le site du Multi Sector Review and Development Plan for Jerusalem, initiative palestinienne pour établir des modèles de développement pour la partie arabe d’Al Qods;
– un rapport – « Impact of the racial separation wall on the different Economic Sectors in East Jerusalem » (2006) – de la Chambre Arabe de Commerce et d’Industrie de Jérusalem-Est sur les conséquences économiques du mur de l’apartheid;
– l’excellente page sur le droit international humanitaire applicable à la Palestine de l’organisation luthérienne suédoise Diakonia contient une page consacrée au statut juridique d’Al Qods;
– la page de Btselem, célèbre ONG de défense des droits de l’homme israëlienne, consacrée à Al Qods;
– le site d’Ir Amim, ONG de Jérusalem pour un développement juste, équitable et consensuel de la ville, avec son rapport récent intitulé « Negotiations towards an Accord on Jerusalem: »
– le rapport (« Building Walls, Breaking Communities: The Impact of the Annexation Wall on East Jerusalem Palestinians » – 2005) de l’ONG palestinienne Al Haq sur les conséquences pour Al Qods du mur de l’apartheid;
– la page consacrée à Al Qods par l’Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI);
– page des documents sur Al Qods de l’UNISPAL (United Nations Information System on the Question of Palestine);
Filed under: ethnicité, Falastin | Tagged: al qods, ariel sharon, Colonisation, discrimination, ehud olmert, haïm ramon, israël, itzhak rabin, jérusalem, mur de l'apartheid, mur de séparation, palestine, purification ethnique, sionisme, territoires occupés |