De Rabin à Olmert, la purification ethnique continue à Al Qods (Jérusalem)

Un rapport assez ancien (2004) du Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, « A Fence Around Jerusalem – The Construction of the Security Fence Around Jerusalem: General background and implications for the city and its metropolitan area » qui porte sur les conséquences du mur de l’apartheid sur Al Qods (Jérusalem) et particulièrement sa population palestiniennes apporte des informations intéressantes, et très détaillées concernant la période 1995-2004.

Saviez-vous par exemple que si le mur de l’apartheid fût réalisé à l’initiative de Sharon, sa planification et conception remontent à Rabin, prix Nobel de la paix:

The initial conception and incipient planning of the fence date back to the second government of Yitzhak Rabin, when Moshe Shahal, the Minister of Interior Security, initiated planning for the “seam zone.” (p. 2)

At the beginning of 1995, the wave of suicide bombings which began in late 1994, during the Oslo process, and extensive Palestinian criminal activity — theft of cars and of agricultural implements — led to the formulation of the “seam zone” plan. The term referred to a geographic strip (340 kilometers long, including the Jerusalem area, and ranging in width from a few kilometers to 20 kilometers) along both sides of the Green Line, which would be utilized to preempt and prevent terrorist and criminal activity originating from the West Bank.

On January 31, 1995, ten days after a terrorist attack at the soldiers’ hitchhiking station at Beit Lid junction, the Cabinet instructed the Finance Minister and the Interior Security Minister to set up teams in order to examine ways and means to bring about a separation between the population of sovereign Israel and the Palestinian population in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and to consider the economic and security implications of such a separation.3 The decision led to the establishment of a committee headed by Interior Security Minister Moshe Shahal, which drew up a plan based on three principles: Palestinians would be allowed to enter Israel through official crossing points after obtaining an entry permit and undergoing a security check by the Israel Police; the volume of vehicular traffic into Israel from the territories would be reduced and a system introduced to ensure the entry of goods and merchandise in a controlled manner through the official crossing points; and potential infiltrators and vehicles would be prevented (as far as possible) from entering Israel outside these points. The committee recommended the introduction of permanent and continuous routine-security measures (known as batash in the military Hebrew acronym) between the crossing points, this under the responsibility of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), and the construction of an obstacle on the access routes to prevent infiltration.

In the Jerusalem region the committee recommended the deployment of police and Border Police forces to supervise and oversee those entering the city. More specifically, the committee recommended the creation of six crossing points for goods, vehicles, and people seeking to enter the city from the West Bank. In addition, the committee said, access routes traversing Jerusalem’s area of jurisdiction should be blocked in order to ensure that traffic passed solely through the official crossing points. (pp. 7-8)

Et paradoxalement, ce fût sous Netanyahou que le projet de Rabin puis de Peres fût mis en veilleuse:

In July 1996, Yitzhak Mordechai, the Defense Minister in the new government of Benjamin Netanyahu, declared that he opposed the Rabin government’s separation plan. The plan was put on hold. (p. 9)

Et ce fût en réaction à une initiative d’un leader travailliste, Haïm Ramon (« Against this backdrop, MK Haim Ramon, a ranking figure in the Labor Party, established the Movement for Unilateral Separation« , p. 10), que Sharon initia la réalisation de ce projet travailliste.

La situation des résidents palestiniens d’Al Qods, titulaires d’une carte d’identité israëlienne mais non-citoyens, habitant en dehors des limites municipales d’Al Qods (la ville, annexée à Israël en 1967, s’étend de facto au-delà des limites municipales traditionnelles de jure, et empiète donc sur le territoire cisjordanien non-annexé à Israël) mérite d’être soulignée – ils sont considérés comme résidents permanents en Israël comme n’importe quelle au pair thaïlandaise ou philippine:

First, there is the problem of the East Jerusalem population, who carry Israeli ID cards but reside outside the Jerusalem area of jurisdiction, in Judea and Samaria. They have a singular legal status — permanent residents of Israel who are not citizens and reside outside the territory of the state. From the strictly legal point of view, no obligation exists to find the easiest or the shortest way for this group to enter Jerusalem, as their entry into Jerusalem constitutes a passage between two separate legal entities. (p. 23)

Cette catégorie de Palestiniens-là est donc étrangère dans son propre pays… Et savez-vous pourquoi ils n’habitent plus Al Qods? Parce que les autorités israëliennes n’accordent pas de permis de construire aux Arabes de la ville, alors que les mêmes autorités sont plus généreuses lorsque lesdits permis sont demandés en dehors d’Al Qods, démographie oblige:

The separation fence, especially to the east and north of Jerusalem, will make life very difficult for everyone who lives in East Jerusalem and the adjacent suburbs, and will have a significant impact on the status and economy of the entire city. The fence will split villages and neighborhoods, such as Abu Dis and A-Ram, and in some cases will separate members of the same family or hamula (clan). Unlike most of the separation fence, the obstacle in Jerusalem will divide not only Jews from Arabs but also cut off the Arab neighborhoods of East Jerusalem from the neighborhoods and villages outside the city’s area of jurisdiction. The critical question in this connection is the functioning of the crossing points and their operational regime.

Moreover, as noted above, various difficulties, as well as restrictions imposed by the Israeli authorities, have greatly limited Arab residential construction within Jerusalem. As a result, many Arab residents of the city who hold Israeli ID cards and “residents of the territories” are living in the same suburbs outside the city’s area of jurisdiction (in A-Ram and Al Azariya, for example). In some cases, some members of the same family or clan live in the city while others live outside. The “Jerusalemites” who reside outside the city are heavily dependent on Jerusalem in their everyday life and for the services they need. Thus, many children living outside the city attend schools in East Jerusalem, the residents turn to hospitals in East Jerusalem for medical services, and many hold jobs that are part of the Israeli labor market (including in the Jerusalem Municipality). Conversely, many students who reside in East Jerusalem attend Al Quds University, most of which is located in Abu Dis (outside the municipal area), and the cheaper shopping centers in Al Azariya and A-Ram rely on Jerusalem buyers. (pp. 71-72)

Par ailleurs, les auteurs soulignent et regrettent que ledit mur ne sépare pas plus clairement juifs et Palestiniens à Al Qods:

The major difficulty lies in the fact that in many cases the fence in the Jerusalem area does not separate Jewish and Arab populations, but instead cuts off Arabs living in the West Bank from Arabs living within the municipal boundaries of Jerusalem, despite the close family, social, and economic ties that bind the two groups. (p. 4)

To date, however, domestic political considerations have dictated that the fence will follow a route that leaves the majority of the Arab population on the “Israeli side.” It needs to be asked whether, given the vast planning and budget effort, which is subjecting Israel to mounting criticism in the international arena, it would not have been right to go one step further and try to “remove” from Israeli Jerusalem additional groups of Palestinians. This approach could be based on the fact that the municipal boundary has already been breached in two places: about 11,000 Palestinians have been excluded from Jerusalem in the Kafr Aqeb area and another 20,000 around Shuafat refugee camp. Thus, it is argued, a different route would have enabled the exclusion of several Arab neighborhoods from “Israeli Jerusalem,” reducing the city’s Palestinian population by 100,000 people and helping to strengthen Jerusalem’s status as a city with a solid Jewish majority and as the capital of Israel. (p. 89)

Car les aspects démographiques sont omniprésents, même si des considérations diplomatiques ont empêché les Israëliens de faire une opération de purification ethnique aussi intégrale qu’ils l’auraient souhaité:

Since the city’s unification, Israel has sought to preserve a clear-cut Jewish majority that will constitute demographic affirmation of Israeli control of Jerusalem. However, experts dealing with the future of Jerusalem maintain, on the basis of population projections, that the demographic balance in the city is “detrimental” to the Israeli interest, with the latest studies indicating that by 2020 Arabs will constitute 40 percent of the city’s population.

According to this approach, the prime Israeli interest is to incorporate as few Arabs as possible within “Israeli” Jerusalem, since an Arab population level of 40 to 50 percent is liable to endanger Israeli control not only in the eastern part of the city but in the western part as well.141

To date, however, domestic political considerations have dictated that the fence will follow a route that leaves the majority of the Arab population on the “Israeli side.” It needs to be asked whether, given the vast planning and budget effort, which is subjecting Israel to mounting criticism in the international arena, it would not have been right to go one step further and try to “remove” from Israeli Jerusalem additional groups of Palestinians.

This approach could be based on the fact that the municipal boundary has already been breached in two places: about 11,000 Palestinians have been excluded from Jerusalem in the Kafr Aqeb area and another 20,000 around Shuafat refugee camp. Thus, it is argued, a different route would have enabled the exclusion of several Arab neighborhoods from “Israeli Jerusalem,” reducing the city’s Palestinian population by 100,000 people and helping to strengthen Jerusalem’s status as a city with a solid Jewish majority and as the capital of Israel. (pp. 88-89)

Et c’est surtout sous l’angle démographique – le risque d’un retour dans les limites municipales d’Al Qods- que les difficultés engendrées par le mur pour les résidents palestiniens d’Al Qods habitant à l’extérieur de la ville pourraient susciter – qui soulève l’inquiétude dans la description des difficultés que rencontrent Palestiniens suite à la construction de ce mur:

From the Palestinians’ point of view, the obstacle, with its fences and enclaves, is the culmination of the restrictions Israel has imposed on their movement between Jerusalem and the territories since the Gulf War of 1991. Indeed, even at this early stage, the existence of a fence appears to be inducing many residents of East Jerusalem (who hold Israeli ID cards) to return to the city from rented accommodations outside the Jerusalem area of jurisdiction for fear of losing their rights. (A similar process of a return to East Jerusalem by residents of the city concerned about the possible loss of their rights occurred at the end of the 1980s, triggered by investigations undertaken by the National Insurance Institute and the Interior Ministry.) The question is how this process dovetails with the Israeli policy of maintaining the demographic balance (at a ratio of 70:30) between Jews and Arabs in Jerusalem. (p. 90)

Enfin, les auteurs du rapport rendent compte de leur façon de l’avis de la Cour internationale de justice sur la légalité du mur rendu le 9 juillet 2004:

The ICJ issued its opinion on the legality of the fence on July 9, 2004.76 The panel of judges declared that Israel “has the obligation to cease forthwith the works of construction of the wall being built by it in the Occupied Palestinian Territory” and that this “entails the dismantling forthwith of those parts of that structure situated within the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem” and the repeal of all legislation and regulations relating to the wall’s construction (par. 151). The vote was 14-1, the only dissenting vote being cast by Judge Thomas Buergenthal, a Jew, from the United States. Judge Buergenthal was also critical of Israel’s actions but argued that the court did not have at its disposal a sufficient factual basis for its sweeping findings and that the court would have done better to refrain from taking up the subject in the first place. (p. 43)

Documents complémentaires sur la purification ethnique et la colonisation à Al Qods:
– « Jerusalem as a Component of Israel’s National Security: Indicators of the State of the Capital, and a Look to the Future » (2006) – rapport israëlien mainstream, inquiet du nombre croissant d’habitants non-juifs à Al Qods;
– « Jerusalem the strangulation of the Arab Palestinian city » (2005), rapport de l’Applied Research Institute of Jerusalem (palestinien), dont on peut également consulter « Jerusalem, In Light of the Israeli Colonization Activities« , de la même année, ainsi que le plus récent (2007) « Israel’s Policy in Occupied East Jerusalem Push for “Voluntarily” & “Quiet Transfer” of Palestinians from the city« ;
– la page consacrée à Al Qods du site pro-palestinien Palestine Monitor;
– le rapport 2007 du Bureau pour la Coordination des Affaires Humanitaires de l’ONU pour les territoires palestiniens occupés, intitulé « East Jerusalem : The Humanitarian Impact of the West Bank Barrier | July 2007« ;
– le communiqué conjoint de l’Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions (ICAHD) et de la Civic Coalition for Defending the Palestinians’ Rights in Jerusalem (CCDPRJ) protestant contre le projet de plan d’urbanisme pour Al Qods adopté par la municipalité de Jérusalem;
étude sur le statut en droit international d’Al Qods (Jérusalem) établie en 1997 par la Division des Droits palestiniens de l’ONU;
– la fiche d’informations de l’ONG Stop the wall consacré à Al Qods;
le site de The Jerusalem Fund for Education & Community Development, ONG étatsunienne;
– la page sur Al Qods de la Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA);
– le site du Jerusalem Center For Social & Economic Rights (JCSER);
– le site du Multi Sector Review and Development Plan for Jerusalem, initiative palestinienne pour établir des modèles de développement pour la partie arabe d’Al Qods;
– un rapport – « Impact of the racial separation wall on the different Economic Sectors in East Jerusalem » (2006) – de la Chambre Arabe de Commerce et d’Industrie de Jérusalem-Est sur les conséquences économiques du mur de l’apartheid;
l’excellente page sur le droit international humanitaire applicable à la Palestine de l’organisation luthérienne suédoise Diakonia contient une page consacrée au statut juridique d’Al Qods;
– la page de Btselem, célèbre ONG de défense des droits de l’homme israëlienne, consacrée à Al Qods;
le site d’Ir Amim, ONG de Jérusalem pour un développement juste, équitable et consensuel de la ville, avec son rapport récent intitulé « Negotiations towards an Accord on Jerusalem:  »
– le rapport (« Building Walls, Breaking Communities: The Impact of the Annexation Wall on East Jerusalem Palestinians » – 2005) de l’ONG palestinienne Al Haq sur les conséquences pour Al Qods du mur de l’apartheid;
la page consacrée à Al Qods par l’Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI);
page des documents sur Al Qods de l’UNISPAL (United Nations Information System on the Question of Palestine);

Israël ne discrimine pas entre ses habitants, surtout à Al Qods

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Lu sur le site d’ACRI (Association for Civil Rights in Israel), au sujet de la situation à Al Qods:

East Jerusalem in Numbers
Number of [Palestinian] residents: Approximately 256,820 (34% of the Jerusalem population) [December 2007 data]
[Palestinian] Families under the poverty line: 67% (as opposed to 21% of Jerusalem’s Jewish families) [2006 data]
Children under the poverty line: 77.2% of the Arab children in the city (as opposed to 39.1% of the city’s Jewish children) [2006 data]
Expropriated land: Since annexing East Jerusalem, the Israeli government has expropriated 24,500 dunams (over a third of the area), which were privately owned by Arabs.
Construction: By the end of 2007, 50,197 housing units for the Jewish population had been built on the expropriated land; no housing units had been built for the Palestinian population on the expropriated land.
Sewage line shortage: 70 kilometers of main sewage lines are lacking.
Lack of water connections: Approximately 160,000 Palestinian residents have no connection to the water network.
Shortage of school classrooms: There is a shortage of 1,500 classrooms.
School dropout rate: Currently stands at approximately 50%.
Average social worker caseload: 190 households per social worker (as opposed to 111 households per social worker in West Jerusalem).
Number of post offices: 2, plus 5 postal agencies (as opposed to 50 postal facilities in West Jerusalem).

Sur le site de Btselem, on y lit des choses intéressantes sur le statut légal de la partie d’Al Qods occupée en 1967, communément appelée Jerusalem-Est:
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Palestinians hold the status of « permanent resident » of the State of Israel. This is the same status granted to foreign citizens who have freely chosen to come to Israel and want to live there. Israel treats Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem as immigrants who live in their homes at the beneficence of the authorities and not by right. The authorities maintain this policy although these Palestinians were born in Jerusalem, lived in the city, and have no other home. Treating these Palestinians as foreigners who entered Israel is astonishing, since it was Israel that entered East Jerusalem in 1967.

L’urbanisme à Jérusalem se décide selon des critères ethniques:
hd_jerusalem_94_07

The Mufti of Jerusalem, Sheikh Mohammed Hussein, and the Palestinian Governor of Jerusalem, Mr. Adnan al-Husseini, opened the press conference and emphasized the grave dangers facing the Palestinian community in East Jerusalem and the importance of the legal and professional work on land and planning issues in the city. Adalah’s General Director Attorney Hassan Jabareen then stated that the goal of the press conference was to expose the work of the Israeli bureaucracy as it affects Jerusalem and the future of the city, since the media only covers issues related to Israel’s visible policies in Jerusalem, such as home demolitions. Land planning policies, however, remain hidden, despite the fact that they are determining the city’s fate over the long term and directly affect the day-to-day lives of Palestinians living there.

Adalah Attorney Suhad Bishara gave a comprehensive presentation of the proposed plan and the effect it will have on the lives of Palestinians in Jerusalem, and on the general character of the city. Attorney Bishara emphasized that the plan is a continuation of the planning approach that is followed by Israel in occupied East Jerusalem, and which does not benefit its Palestinian population, but rather seeks to maintain a permanent Jewish majority within the area designated “united greater Jerusalem.” Under the plan, the proposed highways and railways will preclude the development of the Palestinian community in East Jerusalem and will cut the Arab neighborhoods off geographically from one another. These transportation networks will also make it more difficult for Palestinians to reach their land. The plan would also further entrench the settlements in East Jerusalem and the surrounding area, as well as connect them to each other and to cities inside Israel.
NEWS UPDATE, 27 November 2008, Adalah and Civic Coalition: New Master Plan for Jerusalem District will Place Palestinians in the City in a Stranglehold, Further Entrench the Settlements and Alter the City’s Demographic Composition

Enfin, via le blog Israel Uncovered, j’apprends qu’un général israëlien sera poursuivi pour avoir laissé son fils conduire un véhicule militaire, mais pour avoir tué des civils palestiniens:

Brigadier General Moshe « Chico » Tamir is a devoted and loving father who let his 14-year-old son drive a military all-terrain vehicle. Being the law-abiding organization that it is, the Israel Defense Forces probed the incident, calling it « serious. » As a result, Tamir’s promotion may be put on hold and he may be indicted. Certainly, a brigade commander who tried to cover up his son’s accident by lying deserves to be punished. But the commander of the Gaza Brigade deserves much more for acts considerably more serious – acts that the world defines as war crimes and for which no one has been held accountable. I would like Tamir, the dedicated father, to meet a girl the same age as his beloved son whose world fell apart when she was 14 years old. I saw her in mourning in November 2006, in the courtyard of her destroyed house in Beit Hanun. Islam Athamneh lost eight family members: Her mother, grandmother, grandfather, aunts, uncles and cousins. They fled their house when it was struck by a shell and were killed by another onslaught. The legs of Abdullah, her three-year-old brother, were blown off. Islam, whose father had died years earlier, became an orphan. The soldiers who fired the 11 shells at houses in Beit Hanun were under the command of Tamir, the dedicated dad who let his son take a Tomcar for a joyride. Some 22 people were killed in the shelling and another 40 were hurt. Most lost limbs or sustained head wounds.

(…) Former IDF chief Moshe Yaalon once said about this officer and gentleman that he needs « reeducating » because of endemic disciplinary problems in his brigade. The person who bragged that his brigade behaved like Rottweilers; who thought more violence should be used against Palestinians; who said that the destruction his soldiers caused in a Jenin refugee camp did not « cause him any moral dilemmas, » may now finally be punished. And for what? A Tomcar. And what might just spare him? For all his misdoings, this man may be cleared of blame because he is considered a « well-respected and important » officer in the IDF.

Easy Guide to International Humanitarian Law in the Occupied Palestinian Territory

L’ONG protestante suédoise Diakonia, très active dans le domaine de l’aide au développement, a une page web consacrée à l’application du droit international humanitaire en Palestine occupée. Vous y trouverez notamment des infos, à caractère principalement juridique, sur le statut juridique des territoires palestiniens occupés en 1967, de Gaza après le « retrait » et d’Al Qods/Jérusalem-Est, sur les restrictions de mouvement des Palestiniens des territoires occupés, sur le mur de l’apartheid, et bien évidemment sur les colonies juives.

D’autres sources d’informations:
– la Division des droits des Palestiniens de l’ONU (et si, ça existe!)
– l’Office de coordination des affaires humanitaires dans les territoires palestiniens occupés (en 1967)
– l’ONG palestinienne The Palestinian Human Rights Monitoring Group (PHRMG)
– l’ONG palestinienne Right to enter, pour la défense de la liberté d’entrer et de sortir des territoires palestiniens occupés
– l’ONG palestinienne Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, sise à Gaza
– l’ONG palestinienne Al Haq, consacrée aux droits de l’homme dans les territoires occupés
– l’ONG Badil, pour le droit au retour des réfugiés palestiniens
– la coalition palestinienne Al Awda, également pour le droit au retour des réfugiés palestiniens
– l’ONG arabe israëlienne Adalah
– l’autre ONG arabe israëlienne The Arab Association for Human Rights
– site de l’université palestinienne de Bir Zeït sur le droit à l’éducation dans les territoires occupés
– l’ONG israëlienne MachsomWatch, sur la politique des checkpoints dans les territoires occupés
– l’ONG israëlienne The Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions
– l’ONG israëlienne Btselem, consacrée aux droits de l’homme dans les territoires occupés

Si vous connaissez d’autres sites d’information juridique, des droits de l’homme ou d’études sur la Palestine, merci de me l’indiquer.

Addendum: un commentateur propose les sites suivants:
– un site anarchiste (ça va aggraver ma réputation d’islamo-nihiliste, mais bon…) contre le mur de l’apartheid, Anarchists Against The Wall
– un site d’informations générales sur la situation en Palestine occupée, The Palestine Monitor
– une ONG de soutien aux prisonniers palestiniens d’Israël, Addameer

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